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INTRODUCTION

The choice of whether or not to donate one's organs at death is a very personal decision
that most can agree must be left to individuals. Indeed, protection of a person's rights over his or
her own body has long been a priority in American jurisprudence. However, there are times
when the common good of society as a whole must be considered before an individual or their
surviving relatives' rights over his or her remains. In fact, when moral considerations are taken
into account, there is no just explanation for a refusal to donate one's organs upon death. There
is a serious organ shortage in the United States, and that shortage must be remedied. While most
moral theorists would agree that every person should donate his or her organs upon death,
Americans may not support a drastic measure requiring that all people be considered as donors.
Instead, the following system is proposed, in order to serve both individual autonomy and to
maximize donation rates from those who do wish to donate.
The United States federal government should adopt and implement legislation
establishing a combination of a mandated choice system and a default rule under which all
Americans are considered organ donors upon death unless they have explicitly directed
otherwise, with limited exceptions, because doing so will decrease the deficit of organs available
to Americans at no cost to the decedent or his or her family. The proposed system would consist
of two parts. First, on applications for all forms of government issued identification, tax returns
and voter registration, individuals would be asked the following question and allowed to check a
box for ''Yes" or "No": "Do you wish to be an organ donor upon death?" The answers given
would be logged in a confidential national registry accessible to hospitals and organ registry
networks. An individual's response to this question, whether affirmative or negative, would not
be overridden for any reason, other than the individual's subsequent revocation, including

Maloney 3
opposition of family members. In the event that the person indicated different intentions on
different forms, the most recent designation would act as a revocation of all prior declarations.
Second, in the event that a clear intention on the part of the decedent cannot be discerned
because the person did not express their choice in the above system, the default rule would be to
treat the individual as a donor.

This presumption would be overcome in only limited

circumstances. The first is in the event that the decedent was a minor, his or her parents would
be consulted for their consent or refusal. The other is a limited exception for objections from the
family of the deceased person, on the basis of religious or cultural customs. The procedure
outlined above will maximize donation rates, while still protecting the autonomy of the deceased
person and concerns of family members.

ORGAN DONATION STATISTICS: THE DREADFUL REALITY

In 2009, there were 105,567 people on organ waiting lists in the United States alone.
Unfortunately, there were only 14,630 organ donors, leading to a mere 28,463 transplants that
year. Every ten minutes, another person is added to the wait list. On average, 18 people in the
United States lose their lives each day while waiting for an organ to become available. 1 That
means that over 6,500 Americans die every year waiting for a transplant that never comes.
Advances in medical technology over the past few decades have made it possible for people to
live longer, higher quality lives. However, science has yet to overcome the associated issue of
organ shortages. The number of people on the waitlist is greater than seven times what it was in
1988, while the number of organ donors has only grown to about two and half times what it then

1

Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Need Is Real:
Data. Organdonor.gov, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/data.html (last visited Apri13, 2012).
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was.

2

The United States has an average of approximately 26 donors per million Americans. 3 If

every person who died each year agreed to donate their organs, conservative estimates reveal that
double the amount of usable organs would be harvested each year. 4
America is among the countries at the top of the list of best rates of organ donation in the
world. However, it is surpassed by Spain, Croatia and Portugal, who have attained rates of
approximately 32, 31 and 30 donors per million people, respectively. 5

Even with this

comparatively high rate of organ donation, the need for organs continues to exceed available
donors by enormous amounts. In 2010, Spain had a population of approximately 47 million
people, while the United States had a population of about 317 million people. 6 This means that
there are roughly seven times as many people in the United States than there are in Spain. In
2010, deceased Americans donated only approximately five times as many organs as deceased
Spaniards. With a population that is seven times that of Spain, the United States should have
seven times as many donors. Even more disturbingly, the number of Americans on organ wait
lists was about twenty-one times the number of people in Spain on organ donation wait lists in
2010.

7 8 9

It is not clear why there is such a vast disparity in the size of organ waitlists, but part

of the reason could be Spain's internationally recognized reformed organ donation system.

2

Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Gap
Continues to Widen, Organdonor.gov, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/graphdescription.html, (last visited April
3, 2012).
3
Daily News Staff Writer. Organ donation often comes down to religion and culture; Many Hispanics struggle with
concept, New York Daily News, (March 28, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-0328/entertainment/293 75826_1_organ-donation-organ-donors-donor-network.
4
David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise and Fall in the United States, 61 :2 Rutgers L.
Rev., 295-331, 298 (2009).
5
Irish Kidney Association, Deceased Donors 2010. Council of Europe Countries. Transplant Statistics 2010,
http://ika.ie/pdf/web_stats_2010.pdf, (last visited April21, 2012).
6
Id.
7
According to the Council of Europe Countries 2010 Transplant Statistics, 1,502 deceased people in Spain donated
their organs and 7,943 Americans donated their organs. There were 5,475 Spaniards and 113,744 Americans on
waitlists for organs in 2010. The number of Americans on the waitlist was obtained from the data published by the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).
8
Id. at footnote 5 supra.
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The demand for organs would still far exceed the available supply, even if all eligible
persons were to consent to donate their organs upon death. Since only 26 people per every
million in the United States agree to donate their organs, the current organ shortages are
inevitable.

The number of actual donors is additionally limited by the system in place in

America, because it does not always protect the decedent's wishes and allows their stated
preference to be overruled in many circumstances. Thus, action must be taken to reform the
United States organ donation process to better reflect the altruistic intentions of the American
public.

THE EXISTING SYSTEM

The United States has established an opt-in method which is administered by each state. 10
All states, as well as the District of Columbia, allow for designation as an organ donor on one's
driver's license.

All of the aforementioned territories and Puerto Rico now have donor

registries. 11 There are two important acts which regulate organ donation in the United States.
First is the National Organ Transplant Act (NOT A) and the second is the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA).

9

Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Healthcare Systems
Bureau, Division of Transplantation, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) and Scientific
Registry ofTransp1ant Recipients (SRTR), OPTN I SRTR 2010 Annual Data Report, (2011).
10
Id. at footnote 4 supra. at 299.
11
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Health Resources and Services Administration, State Organ
Donation Legislation, (accurate as of January 2011). For more on the differences between the laws of each state
laws
on
organ
donation,
see
along
with access
to
the
full
text of each state's
http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation_micro/. This database allows for comparison of the different forms of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act adopted by each state, along with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. It also
details revenue sources, legal consent, donation education and living support provided by each of these territories.
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A. The National Organ Transplant Act

NOTA

12

was the first federal law which regulated organ transplants and was enacted in

1984 in response to the concern that a market was developing for the buying and selling of
human organs. 13 NOTA banned the purchase or sale of organs, by making it a crime to provide
or receive any human organ in exchange for valuable consideration. 14 The Act also sought to
promote donation by establishing the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)
which created and maintains a national donor registry for the purpose of matching organs
between donors and recipients! 5 The act mandated that the OPTN be managed by a non-profit
organization and not a public institution. 16 Although there were many other areas of concern that
needed to be addressed, including the lack of uniformity among state laws, NOT A did not
attempt to regulate those issues and they were left to state law.
B. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

In 1968 the UAGA was created in order to standardize the widely varying organ donation
laws among the states and to help increase the number of organs available for donation by
allowing individuals to register as organ donors! 7

All states enacted the UAGA (1968).

Congress decided to give more legal weight to the preferences of the decedent in posthumous
donation and the UAGA was revised in 1987 for that purpose! 8 The UAGA was again revised
in 2006, and has is the law in a majority of states.
12

42 U.S.C. § 273.
Gwen Mayes, JD, MMSc, Buying and Selling Organs for Transplantation in the US: National Organ Transplant
Act of 1984 (NOTA) Bans Buying and Selling, Medscape Education,
http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465200_2, (Dec. 9, 2003).
14 Id.
15
OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Policy Management, National Organ Transplant Act,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/nota.asp (last visited April 21, 20 12).
16 Id.
17
Association of Organ Procurement Organizations, Legislative, http://www.aopo.org/legislative-a33, (last visited
April21, 2012).
18 Id.
13
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In the 1960s, states began enacting statutes that permitted medical examiners and
coroners who had custody over a cadaver to remove certain organs, including corneas and
pituitary glands, without obtaining consent from anyone as long as they were unaware of any
objections. 19

These statutes were successfully implemented in many states, leading to

unprecedented increases in the supply of the organs that coroners and medical examiners were
permitted to harvest. 20 However, presumed consent statutes allowed for the removal of other
organs, that authority was usually not exercised. In fact, many medical examiners and coroners
chose not to harvest any organs or tissue under the presumed consent statutes. 21 Some surviving
family members initiated litigation in response to finding out that organs or tissues had been
taken from their deceased kin, but courts initially upheld presumed consent. 22 One Georgia court
went as far as to hold that the presumed consent statutes fulfill the state's primary goal of
protecting the health of its citizens, and implied that the common good of the public had to be
considered over individual autonomy. 23

Many other courts decided similarly, and when the

UAGA was amended in 1987, it endorsed presumed consent. 24
The 1987 version of the UAGA provided for presumed consent, but limited it in a very
important way.

Instead of allowing medical examiners and coroners to treat individuals as

donors as long as they did not know of any objections, the 1987 UAGA required that they first
make a reasonable effort to contact next of kin to obtain consent. 25 The 1987 UAGA was only
adopted by twenty-six sates, which in combination with developments in technology and

19

Id. at footnote 4 supra. at 302.
Id. at 303
2t Id.
22
Id. at 304
23 ld.
24 Id.
25 Id.
20
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changes in state laws, resulted in inconsistencies among the laws of the states? 6 Additionally,
several subsequent decisions in controversial cases held that family members had limited
property rights in cadavers that were violated by the harvesting of tissues and organs without
their consent. These courts, however, did not establish exactly what process was due families
before presumed consent could be implemented. 27

Due to the change in legal treatment of

presumed consent statutes, the subsequent revisions of the UAGA removed the provision that
was present in the 1987 version which allowed medical examiners and coroners to harvest organs
and tissue without obtaining explicit consent. 28
The UAGA was most recently revised in 2006 for the purpose of achieving uniformity
among the laws of states, as well as to encourage donation. All states have adopted one or more
of the three versions of the UAGA. Currently, forty-four states and Puerto Rico have adopted
the 2006 version, three states have retained the 1987 Act, and three states along with D.C. have
chosen to continue with the 1968 UAGA. 29

30

Thus, the 2006 version of the UAGA is current

law in the vast majority of states.
The 2006 UAGA revision made many changes to prior law in order to facilitate the
donation of more organs. Minors are permitted to make anatomical gifts, provided they would
be allowed to apply for a driver's license at that age. 31 Furthering this theme of autonomy,
Section 8 of the 2006 UAGA gives greater legal effect to the choice of the decedent as to
26

Uniform Law Commission, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Anatomical Gift Act
(2006) Summary, http://www.nccusl.org/ActS ummary.aspx?title= Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20(2006 ), (last
visited April25, 2012).
27
Id. at footnote 4 supra. at 306-7. One of these cases involved a medical examiner who deliberately failed to
communicate with families so that no objections could be made. Most disturbingly, he made a profit by selling the
corneas he harvested. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552,556 (6th Cir. 1999).
28
Id. at 307.
29
Supra. at footnote 11 supra.
30
Uniform Law Commission, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Enactment Status
Map, Acts Anatomical Gift Act (2006),
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20%282006%29 (last visited April 25, 20 12).
31
Rev. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act§ 4(1)(B) (2006)
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effort to increase donation rates. Unfortunately, there are limitless potential reasons why an
individual may fail to adequately express their intention to donate. The disparity between the
number of people who actually register to become organ donors and those who desire to is most
often explained by a general unwillingness of individuals to contemplate the end of their lives. 39
The prevalent aversion to considering one's own death cannot be remedied by mere adjustments
in the law. The impact of this sentiment, however, can be eliminated by requiring individuals to
expressly indicate their intentions.
Even where decedents do communicate their wishes clearly, the existing system allows
surviving family members to override the choice of the decedent.

In some states donor

registration still is not considered binding and the surviving family of the decedent is permitted
to decide whether or not the donation should occur, regardless of what the decedent wished. 40 In
a system which values the intent of the decedent so highly in matters of inheritance, it counterintuitively discounts the importance of the decedent's decisions regarding organ donation.
Families are often allowed to override the decision of the decedent, and refuse to allow organs to
be harvested. Contrary to the 2006 revision of the UAGA, donor cards and other forms of
affirmative consent on the part of the would-be donor are given little legal weight in the face of
objections by family members in practice. "In Indiana in 2000, family members overrode a
decedent's choice to donate in 74 out of 184 cases involving eligible donors who had indicated
their wishes on their drivers' licenses."41 Despite the fact that the 2006 UAGA and most of the
states that have adopted it hold that a decedent's expressed intentions must be honored upon
death, many doctors are reluctant to proceed with donation in the face of familial opposition.

39
40

41
42

Id.
Id. at footnote 4 supra. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 313.

42
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Familial objections prevent many viable organs from being utilized, even now. In response to
this issue, the National Association of Attorneys General passed a resolution in 2010 expressing
its support for an interpretation which limits families' abilities to interfere with an individual's
expressed intention to donate. 43 However, enforcement of the provision which gives donors'
expressed intentions priority over the wishes of family members remains minimal, virtually
eliminating its effectiveness in improving donation rates.
Further evaluation of the current system reveals that allowing families to decide whether
or not a decedent will become an organ donor also hinders donation rates. Currently, different
classes of representatives can make an anatomical gift on the behalf of a deceased person. Many
times, the representatives make the decision to dispose of viable organs, rather than allow them
to be harvested and transplanted. In fact, on average, families who are asked to consent to the
donation of the organs of a deceased relative refuse about half of the time. 44 Thus, by allowing
surviving family members to make the decision, the number of organs donated is cut to half of
what it would be.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO GROWING DEMAND FOR ORGANS

Scholars have discussed numerous ways in which the organ shortages faced by the
United States should be remedied. This section discusses some of those proposals and examines
their potential successes and shortfalls. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages when
all concerns are taken into account. Several of these options would be viable if not for the
serious moral and ethical issues that they raise. Other options, including the existing system,

43

National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution In Support Of Respecting And Upholding The Decisions
Made By Persons Who Elect To Be Organ, Eye, And Tissue Donors, (June 2010). Available at
http:/ /www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/resolution.20 1006.Resolution_NAAG_Public_Health_Safety_Committ
ee.pdf.
44
Howard M. Nathan, et al., Organ Donation in the United States, 3 Am. J. Transplantation 29--40, 31 (2003).
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would not substantially improve the situation because they would not result in enough organs
being donated to decrease organ shortages. A combination of both a mandatory choice and a
presumed consent system creates a balance that can achieve large increases in donor rates
without impairing individual autonomy to an unacceptable extent.
A. Routine Recovery

Perhaps the most effective system, at least from a solely practical standpoint, would be
that of routine recovery. Under this system, all viable organs would be harvested regardless of
consent, in a routine process at the time of death. 45 Very few scholars have advocated a switch
to this system, most likely because it would be negatively received from the American public
who highly value autonomy and rights over their own bodies. However, the researchers who
have endorsed this strategy argue that the requirement for consent is the major cause of organ
shortages in the United States. 46 In support of this radical approach, scholars have contended
that honoring a decedent's. wishes cannot be made a priority over the preventable loss of human
life.

47

Additionally, supporters claim that this system would be commonly accepted, citing other

examples of government powers which overrule an individual's choice to promote the common
good,

including

circumstances. 48

required

vaccinations

and

mandatory

autopsies

under

suspicious

This system would avoid many of the problems associated with other

programs. Indeed, it would eliminate concerns that poverty stricken people would be exploited
under schemes that allow monetary incentives. 49 Routine recovery would also remove the need
for administrative costs of maintaining a registry for organ donors, because all people would be

45

Aaron Spital & James Stacey Taylor, Routine Recovery of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: Consistent,
Fair, and Life-Saving, 2 Clin. J. Am. Soc. Nephrol. 300-303 (2007).
46
Id. at 300.
47
Id. at 30 1.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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considered donors.

50

Supporters also argue that routine recovery would be more equitable than

other systems because it would not allow a person to benefit from the generosity of other donors
during life, only to fail to become a donor upon death. 5 1
In response to criticisms that a routine recovery system infringes upon the right of an
individual to determine the fate of his or her body after death, scholars have argued that the right
to autonomy extinguishes upon death. 52

Alternatively, they contend that even if the right

remains, it cannot be enforced at the expense of lives of other people who are waiting for organ
transplants. 53 On a similar note, proponents of routine recovery state that fear of offending
surviving family members should not be allowed to prevail over the potential to save lives. 54
This line of reasoning appears sound at first blush, but a closer examination reveals serious
flaws.
Although the routine recovery approach would maximize donation rates, it ignores a
person's posthumous intent for the disposition of their organs. Not only does it prohibit refusal,
but by extinguishing a decedent's right to control over what happens to their body after his or her
death, routine recovery directly contradicts the portion of the 2006 UAGA that allows for
anatomical gifts to specific persons chosen by the donor. A willing donor should at least be
afforded the opportunity to specify a loved one who they would wish to benefit from the
selflessness of their actions, as opposed to a complete stranger. Further, the justification relying
on the importance of the common good and the unnecessary loss of life discounts important
questions of familial rights. According to some religions and cultures, it is unacceptable to

5o Id.
51

Id.

52

Id. at 302.

53

Id.
Id.

54
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perform proper burial rights upon a person whose body is not intact. 55 Thus, routine recovery
would result in significant emotional distress to survivors who have an established custom of
refusing to allow the harvesting of organs. Supporters of routine recovery neglect this extremely
personal matter, too readily dismissing the emotions of grieving family members. This issue,
combined with the staunch commitment of the American people to individual autonomy, makes
it clear that even if this system somehow received enough support to be implemented, there
would be widespread opposition to routine recovery. Therefore, the routine recovery proposal is
ill suited for the United States, and would likely fail to be enacted or enforced.
B. Monetary Incentives

NOT A provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive,
or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce. " 56 In direct contravention NOT A, and
similar statewide prohibitions on the receipt of compensation in return for organ donation, many
have advocated in defense of monetary incentives to increase the number of people willing to
posthumously donate their organs. In fact, various states have proposed or enacted legislation
that provides payment, in cash or in kind, to surviving family members of organ donors.
The state of Pennsylvania passed a law in 1999 that would allow payment of $300.00
toward funeral expenses families of organ donors. 57 The program was never initiated due to
NOTA, the federal law which makes such payment illegal. 58 For a time, Georgia also took

55

See detailed discussion of religious preferences at 32-4 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 274e
57
P.A. Clark, Financial Incentives For Cadaveric Organ Donation: An Ethical Analysis, 4 Internet Journal of Law,
Healthcare and Ethics 1 (2006).
58 ld.
56
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initiative by offering a $7.00 discount on the fees paid to obtain a driver~s license. 59 When this
incentive was discontinued in 2005, Georgia had one of the highest donation rates in the
country. 60 It is worth noting, however, that organ procurement organizations were disinclined to
rely upon the validity of the Georgia registry while the discount program was in place due to
moral and ethical concems. 61 Other proposals have included direct payment to families or the
decedent's estate, tax credits, payments toward education expenses of the children of the
deceased and donation to a charity of the decedent's choice on their behalf. 62
Some suggested financial incentives gamer more public support than others. In a 2007
study of analyzing responses of Pennsylvania residents to monetary incentive schemes,
researchers found that 59o/o of people are in favor of initiatives which provide benefits to families
who decide to donate their loved one~s organs. 63 Participants expressed much higher levels of
support when these payments were to be applied to funeral expenses, donated to charities, paid
for travel and lodging or covered medical expenses. 64

Although most people stated that

monetary incentives would have no impact upon their choice to donate organs on behalf of
themselves or their family members, the majority of those who acknowledged that it would
influence their decision replied that it would increase the probability that they would choose to
donate. 65 Despite the seemingly overwhelming support for financial incentive programs, the law
as it stands prohibits them on the basis of moral and ethical considerations.

59

David H. Howard, Producing Organ Donors, American Economic Association, 21 Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 25-36, 30 (2007).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62
Id.at footnote 57 supra.
63
C.L. Bryce et al. Do Incentives Matter? Providing Benefits to Families of Organ Donors, 5 Am. J. Transplantation
2999-3008, 3001' (2005).
64
81% of study participants approved of allocations for funeral expenses, 73% for charitable donations, 78% for
travel and lodging and 84% for medical expenses. Id.
65
I d. at 3001-2.
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Opponents of financial incentive systems have explained that to allow any type of
payment compromises fundamental principles of organ donation. One issue is that to provide
monetary benefits for organ donors increases the chances of donors acting as a result of coercion
instead of altruism, as has traditionally been the standard. 66

These scholars argue that the

primary purposes of NOTA were to prevent the treatment of human organs as commodities and
to provide equal access to organs across socioeconomic lines. 67 Many scholars fear that financial
benefits to organ donors will prey upon the desperation of the poverty stricken, allowing more
affluent Americans to exploit them. 68 Critics of programs involving payment have also argued
that such a system could result in conflicts of interest that cannot exist in harmony with informed
consent. 69

Some opponents claim that incentives would result in the commercialization of

organs, compromising human dignity and devaluing human life. 70 While these are compelling
concerns that warrant significant consideration, supporters of a system of payments for organ
donors have been quick to dismiss them.
Proponents of monetary benefits for donors emphasize a commitment to saving lives as
well as to individual autonomy in making decisions about organ donation. In defense of this
system, many supporters compare it to other legal forms of selling portions of one's body, such
as blood and reproductive cells. 71 Additionally, these scholars argue that, for the same reasons as
women are allowed to receive payment for the surrogate hosting of other people's children and
the government is permitted to pay to induce people to join the voluntary army, benefits to organ

66

Francis L. Delmonico, M.D., et al. Ethical Incentives-- Not Payment- For Organ Donation, 346 New Eng. J.
Med. 2002-2005, 2002, (2002).
67 Id.
68
Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ
Donations, at page 26. Available at
http://home. uchicago.edu/gbecker/MarketforLiveandCadavericOrganDonations_Becker_Elias.pdf.
69
Id. at footnote 57 supra.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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donors are acceptable. 72 Proponents contend that the claim that this program would result in the
immoral commoditization of organs is refuted by the government's own actions of paying
voluntary soldiers to risk their bodies and their lives if sent to war. 73 This comparison is used not
only to in the context of commercialization of human life, but also in response to concerns about
exploitation of the underprivileged. Researchers argue that expectations that a voluntary army
would become an army of the poor, motivated by financial needs, did not come about because
many low income people could not qualify due to inadequate education, corresponding deficient
test scores and other factors. 74 It follows that many individuals living in poverty would not be
able to donate organs as a result of unsatisfactory living conditions that cause many of the poor
to suffer from diseases would prevent them from donating organs, as they would pose too high a
risk to the organ recipient. 75 Instead, proponents contend that most organs would come from the
middle class. 76 Some scholars also argue that the individual autonomy of poor people is best
served by allowing them to decide whether or not they should donate their organs in exchange
for monetary benefit. 77 Other researchers have stated that exploitation can be minimized through
government regulation which would mandate that donors be fully informed of all risks so that no
impulsive decisions are made and that proper after care would take place. 78 Finally, proponents
claim that financial incentives would eliminate the black market for organs, thereby improving
quality of organs donated and ending the already existing exploitation of the poor. 79
Financial incentives create many ethical and moral issues, especially if they are to be paid
during the donor's life. If limited to payment of certain funeral expenses, or other post-mortem
72

Id.
Id.
Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
73
74

at footnote 68 supra. at 25.
at 26.

at footnote 57 supra.
at 28.

Maloney 18
benefits, it appears that the general public would support the system.

However, it remains

unclear whether this would result in a significant increase in the number of people who choose to
posthumously donate their organs or those of a loved one. As is noted above, a majority of
people surveyed stated that financial incentives would not impact their decision to donate their
organs or the organs of a family member one way or another. Notably, many researchers have
instead encouraged the removal of any financial disincentives, the loss of money that is often
incurred by live donors, as a more effective way to increase donation rates, without creating the

° For the foregoing reasons, use of financial incentives to

ethical problems discussed above. 8

increase cadaveric organ donation would likely not be the most successful route.
C. Priority for Registered Donors

Many people who have agreed to donate their organs upon death are troubled by the
prospect that an individual who has not agreed to donate their own organs upon death might
receive a donation ahead of a selfless individual who has also agreed to donate their organs upon
death.

Several measures have been privately initiated in response to this concern, but no

government action has yet been taken to remedy this situation in the United States.

The

following three programs attempt to prevent an organ recipient from later refusing to become an
organ donor, but all three are infeasible for the same reasons.
The NJ Sharing Network has recently offered the self-coined '"Golden Rule proposal''
which it hopes a state legislator will sponsor. 81 The golden rule proposal would allow health
insurance companies to refuse to cover the costs of organ transplantation for any person who

°

8

Financial Incentives for Organ Donation: Removing the Disincentive to Donate, Medscape,
http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465739 _3, (last visited April25, 2012).
81
Star Ledger Editorial Board, Stronger Measures Needed to Encourage People to Donate Organs, Star Ledger
(March 25, 2012) Available at
http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2012/03/strong_measures_needed_to_enco.html.
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fails to consent to donation of their organs upon death. 82

This proposition rests upon the

principle that those who are unwilling to give the gift of life, should not be permitted to receive a
life saving transplant. It is unlikely that most individuals in need of a transplant would be able to
afford the "hundreds of thousands of dollars" 83 in medical expenses normally incurred for
transplant surgery. Thus, this proposal would force most would-be organ recipients to consent to
donation of their own organs or face the insurmountable burden of paying for the entire
operation.
Similarly, mutual insurance pools are gaining popularity. According to LifeSharers, one
nationwide non-profit organization which promises its members priority to other members'
donated organs over nonmembers, about half of the people who receive donated organs have not
committed to donating their own organs upon death. 84 This means that when a member of
LifeSharers dies, any match within that network is considered ahead of a person who has not
signed up. However, there is an exception allowing donation to a member of the decedent's
family ahead of other people registered with LifeSharers. 85 The network is free to join and
accepts anyone, regardless of their health or potential ability to provide viable organs. 86
Members become eligible to receive from a donor in the network 180 days after their
registration. 87 Since its launch in May of 2002, Life Sharers has attracted over 15,000 members. 88
However, no member has yet died under circumstances that made the donation of organs an
option.89
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In at least one country, the idea that in order to receive an organ one must be willing to
donate their own has been made into law. Israel has adopted a system that went into effect April
1, 2012 giving priority on waitlist to those who agree to donate their organs upon death. 90 The
Israeli program is the first to allow consideration of a non-medical factor when determining
which patient on the waitlist will receive a donated organ. 91 A distinguishing feature of Israel's
approach is that it will not allow someone with less medical need to surpass an individual whose
need is more severe. 92 Instead, it simply awards preference to individuals who have agreed to
donate organs upon their deaths in the event that two individuals are otherwise equally qualified
to receive the organ. 93 Interestingly, having a spouse or close relative who has registered as
donors or who has donated organs in the past can also result in priority treatment for Israelis,
where such donors did not limit their gift to a specific recipient. 94 Thus, the recent change in
Israel attempts to address some of the concerns about giving waitlist priority, while still serving
the principle of fairness.
While it seems acceptable theoretically that only people who are willing to donate their
own organs upon death should benefit from the receipt of a needed organ during life, this
approach has serious weaknesses. One issue is that a system like this presupposes that those who
have not expressed an intention to donate their organs would not later decide to donate their
organs. An extreme example would be that, under any of the above programs, a 60 year old
alcoholic who has agreed to donate his organs upon death to receive an organ over a 14 year old
child who has no legal authority to express an intention to donate one way or another. Most
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people would probably agree that a child should receive priority over an adult, especially an
adult with self-destructive tendencies. However, the above methods would allow adults priority
access to donated organs, in some instances even ahead of those who need them more, or others
who actually have agreed to donate their organs upon death. 95 Opponents of these plans also
argue that they are coercive measures which improperly limit individual autonomy by ''twisting
arms" so that people will register as organ donors out of fear. 96 Scholars have contended that
such strong-armed tactics result in fewer donations for altruistic reasons and a general suspicion
of the organ donation process.

Furthermore, critics argue that this system legalizes, even

enforces religious discrimination, as some religions forbid the making of anatomical gifts. 97 As a
result, people with religious objections to organ donation will be unfairly treated. The recently
proposed golden rule plan, in addition to giving insurance companies far more power than they
ought to have to refuse to cover transplant surgeries, opponents argue that the most similar fair
option would be to permit people to sell their organs, thereby honoring their autonomy while still
permitting them to make the final decision over whether or not to donate without any penalties. 98
Furthermore, there is nothing to stop people from taking advantage of the system and agreeing to
donate when they are in need of an organ, then revoking that consent after they have received it.
For the reasons discussed herein, the different versions of waitlist preference all fail on crucial
moral and practical bases, and they should therefore not be implemented in the United States.
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D. Mandated Choice

One of the central issues in the debates over ways to improve organ donation revolves
around the consent of the decedent in the use of their organs after death. Since most people do
not formally express an intention as to whether or not they want to posthumously donate their
organs during life, there is considerable argument over how much power the government should
have to make assumptions regarding consent. The failure of individuals to declare their choice is
cited as one of the main reasons for the organ shortages in the United States. 99 A mandated
choice system preserves individual self-determination by giving a decedent's choice on organ
donation legal effect and by requiring that the choice be made. 100 A donor's declaration would
be a sufficient indication of intent and would relieve doctors of the task of obtaining consent
from surviving next of kin for organ donation. 101

For example, in 2006 Illinois adopted a

mandated choice system that remains in place. 102 Donate Life Illinois, a non-profit organization
responsible for maintaining the state's donor registry, reports that 60% of adults are registered
donors in Illinois, a statistic that is much higher than the national rate. 103

104

Proponents argue that a mandated choice program would best honor individual autonomy
by making a decedent's choice legally binding and disallowing any overriding of that choice. 105
As is explained above, family members are often allowed to override the choice of a decedent
who has expressed their intent to donate. Supporters also contend that requiring individuals to
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make a choice, coupled with ensuring that agencies charged with obtaining consent are equipped
with information to provide individuals which would educate them on the impact of their
decision, would satisfy the need for informed consent that is fundamental in any moral
evaluation of organ donation. 106 While critics argue that this will create a new class of specific
non-donors, thereby limiting available organs for donation, this criticism is not in line with the
fact that most Americans indicate that they would like to be organ donors. 107 Additionally, it
will encourage donors to record their decision because they will know that it cannot be
overturned by their families after death. 108 Opponents also argue that an individual's decision
may change by the time of their death. 109 However, the proposed system eliminates this need for
concern by making the decision revocable, and only accepting the most recent decision that one
has made.
E. Opt-Out

Many countries, especially in Europe, have established an opt-out system, which is
commonly referred to as presumed consent.

In an opt-out system, it is assumed that an

individual has consented to organ donation unless that person has explicitly indicated his or her
refusal to donate organs upon death. 110 Many countries have implemented opt-out programs,
including Spain and Austria. 111 These methods vary from what are considered "soft", like the
system in Spain, to those that are considered ''hard" like the program in Austria. 112 A soft opt-out
is characterized by involvement and consultation of relatives of the decedent in the donation
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process. 113 A hard system is one that does not make the views of family members a priority,
proceeding with organ harvesting unless presented with a known objection of the decedent. 114
The portion of the proposed solution contained herein that applies a switch to an opt-out program
would be considered hard. While Spain's soft system has helped it to attain the highest donation
rates in the world, it has been found that its success in this area has been influenced by many
other factors. 115
Some studies have indicated that the mere implementation of a switch to a presumed
consent regimen result in an increase in organ donations, projecting in some instances that the
change would result in a 25-30% greater donation rate. 116

117

However, other studies indicate that

a change to a presumed consent scheme does not create a notable increase in available organs. 118
Although the level of effectiveness of opt-out programs is disputed, the combination with a
mandated choice rule would likely optimize the potential success. In addition to concerns about
effectiveness, one of the main criticisms of the presumed consent system is that it would infringe
upon the rights of the deceased and their surviving relatives. 119 However, the proposed system
takes these into account by allowing exceptions for religious or cultural beliefs and in the event
that the decedent is a minor.
The proposed system calls for mandated choice and only applies presumed consent in the
event that a choice has not clearly been designated. Since a majority of people would prefer to
donate organs, the default rule in the event that an individual has not made a clear declaration
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should be based upon the widely held opinion, rather than the view of the minority. 120 The next
section evaluates the moral implications of the suggested program.

MORAL ANALYSIS

Many theories of justice exist, and each approach has different concepts of what actions
are morally right and wrong.

Most theorists would agree that the common good of the

community must be considered ahead of individual desires. Thus, most plans to increase organ
donation, an action that allows one person to save as many as twenty-five lives, are supported
across all schools of thought. This section conducts moral analyses of the proposed combined
mandated choice and opt-out systems from different theoretical perspectives.
A. Utilitarian Perspective

Utilitarian theorists engage in a sort of cost-benefit analysis that seeks to maxtmtze
happiness and minimize pain. 121 They look to the greatest net good, meaning the greatest good
to the greatest number of people, offset by any harm the action might cause. 122

Notably,

utilitarians believe that rights of individuals can be overridden, so long as it would better serve
the greater good. 123 Such an evaluation requires a measurement of the happiness produced by
increasing cadaveric organ donation against the discomfort to the public of introducing the
proposed legislation. Notably, the suggested system simply requires members of society to make
a choice regarding whether or not they would consent to give others the gift of life at the time of
their own death. Since the individual cannot be posthumously harmed by the harvesting of their
organs, the analysis must instead be based upon the feeling of discomfort created by requiring a
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person to contemplate his or her own death. Thus, the calculus becomes the good created by
saving many lives balanced against the harm inherent in causing mental uneasiness. It is evident
that the goal of saving lives far outweighs the harm of requiring a contemplation that all
individuals must eventually face anyway. Therefore, the mandated choice portion of the regime
that is recommended herein is clearly supported by utilitarian principles.
In the event that an individual has failed to make a decision under the mandated choice
system, a default rule of presumed consent is also supported by utilitarian theory. Here, the
happiness caused by the saving of lives must be weighed against the potential that an
individual's autonomy will be limited and the chance that surviving family will experience
mental anguish. However, it is important to note in this analysis that an individual will only be
deprived of the choice in this matter by failing to respond under the primary portion of the law.
Thus, individual autonomy is only limited here to the extent that a person refused to exercise
their right to make a decision in the first place. As an additional safeguard of an individual's
right to self-determination, opt-out systems allow for the presentation of evidence that the person
explicitly expressed refusal to donate their organs. In fact, since the good of saving human life is
such an important one, utilitarian theorists would most likely support any system that did not
result in a corresponding loss of life. Therefore, it is clear that utilitarian theorists would support
the use of a presumed consent default rule in the absence of an individual expression of intent
one way or another.
B. John Rawls: Justice as Fairness

John Rawls argues that justice can best be achieved by focusing on fairness.

124

In

evaluating whether a considered action is just or not, Rawls argues that the choice must be made
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from an original position, where decision makers are making the rules for a new society. 125 In
the original position, individuals make the rules of their society from behind a veil of ignorance
which prevents them from having any bias that could be present were they to know anything
about their position in society. 126 People in this position would be best situated to address
scarcity in a fair, and accordingly, just, way. 127 Therefore, to evaluate whether the methods
suggested herein are just, it must be decided how those in the original position would rectify
scarcity of organs.
The first thing those in the original position would do is to establish equal rights and
individual liberties for all people. 128 It is likely that autonomy with regard to choices about one's
own body would be one of these rights. When determining distributive issues, Rawls' difference
principle states that if those in the original position are unaware whether they will be
disadvantaged in society, they will act to protect those that are. 129 Applied to the present
consideration, if those in the original position do not know whether or not they will be in need of
a scarce resource such as an organ, they will act to ensure that those who are in need of organs
actually receive them. Consequently, the drafters of the social contract would probably seek to
include measures that, without unfairly limiting individual liberties, could maximize the potential
organs available for donation.
The method that best fits the above described criteria is the mandated choice option
which allows people to make the choice for themselves. Indeed, those in the original position
might decide that the rights of individuals would be improperly limited by a program that ignores
the need for consent, such as routine recovery. Mandated choice would certainly satisfy the
125
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negotiators in the original position. It is, however, less clear whether those individuals would
support a default rule of presumed consent in the absence of a declaration made during life.
Despite their concerns about individual freedoms, those in the original position might approve of
an opt-out system that is triggered by a person's failure to make a decision one way or another.
The argument in favor of this option would be that if someone failed to make the decision,
presumed consent is not overriding their preference, but instead simply applying a default rule
that reflects majority opinion. Since the goal is to reduce the scarcity of organs in order to save
lives, the people drafting the social contract would likely support even the secondary portion of
the proposed legislation involving presumed consent.
C. John Finnis: Natural Law Theory

In his description of natural law, John Finnis presents an exhaustive list 130 of seven
equally important basic forms of good to be pursued that are held as self-evident. 131 These seven
goods are life 132 , knowledge 133 , play 134 , aesthetic experience 135 , sociability (friendship)
practical reasonableness 137 and religion 138 • These values guide one's practical reasoning

139

136

,

and

"are all of the basic purposes of human action.~' 14 ° Finnis contends that when individuals make
choices regarding which of these values will be priorities in their life plan, they are engaging in
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the good of practical reasonableness. 141 It is through this process that the natural law method of
determining the morality of an action is accomplished. 142
In order to properly employ practical reasonableness, Finnis explains the following nine
requirements: one must (I) have a rational life plan; 143 (2) not arbitrarily prefer one basic good
over another;

144

(3) not make arbitrary preferences among persons; 145 (4) be detached; 146 (5)

make commitments;

147

( 6)

consider consequences; 148 (7) not choose directly against a basic

value; 149 (8) promote the common good; 150 and (9) follow one's conscience. 151 Finnis contends
that the result of satisfying these nine requirements is morality. 152 Thus, each of these steps are
considered in tum below, with reference to the seven common goods and the theories of
community and justice which are expounded by Finnis, demonstrating that natural law dictates
acceptance of the proposed methods, and may even require more radical measures.
The precondition that one must have a rational life plan corresponds closely with the
fourth and fifth requirements of detachment and commitment, compelling an individual to decide
upon a particular overall objective in his or her life 153 , and to refuse to abandon that devotion
lightly. 154 However, the necessity for detachment entails not allowing one purpose or project to
become the sole objective of one's life, so that if one were to fail to accomplish this objective
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their life would be "drained of meaning." 155 These areas are not as much a part of the decision
making aspect of practical reasonableness, as they are preconditions for fruitfully engaging in the
process. Accordingly, for purposes of this analysis, satisfaction of these criteria is assumed.
Turning first to the statement that none of the seven values should be arbitrarily preferred
to another, natural law theory stresses the importance of recognizing the magnitude of each one.
Finnis expresses that any reasonable favoring of one value over others must not discount the
inherent goodness of all seven, but instead be based upon an analysis of one's own abilities. 156
This means that in order to meet the standards of practical reasonableness, one must not succumb
to a "thin theory of the good" which only regards certain basic values as imperative. 157 Instead,
in one's own life and in one's interaction with others, an individual must always bear in mind
every basic value is equal to the others. Thus, one may not say that one value is more or less
important.

Considering the issue presented herein, it is clear that at this stage a reasonable

person should find that, where all of the basic values are promoted by the suggested action and
none of these goods are devalued 158 , the proposed legislation is indeed consistent with natural
law morality.

The good of life is served by saving the lives of many organ recipients.

Friendship is also advanced because one person, in an ultimate act of friendship, is giving the gift
of life to another.

Practical reasonableness is achieved by participating in this analytical

framework. The basic value of religion is furthered on two accounts: (1) many religions support
and even encourage organ donation; 159 and (2) the organ recipient has the opportunity to go on to
incorporate this good into his or her own life. The goods of knowledge, play, aesthetic
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experience are all honored because the organ recipient whose life is saved can go on to pursue
these goods, where otherwise all parties would have died.
Next is the premise that no arbitrary preferences may be made amongst persons. This
aspect is of particular significance in determining the morality of the proposed legislation. Here,
Finnis defines a reasonable scope of self-preference to include those actions that would be
required in one's individual participation in the seven basic goods toward the end of one's own
well-being. 160 He goes on to cite to the golden rule that people should do unto others what they
would want others to do unto them. 161 Additionally, Finnis states that one may not prevent
others from obtaining that which one is attempting to get for oneself. 162 Those organ recipients
who do not wish to donate upon death, are in direct violation of this principle. Similarly, Finnis
explains the idea of commutative justice as including a duty to many different people. One of
these duties arises if one has abused '"some system that is advantageous to oneself and others,
knowing that one's abuse might bring about the limitation ... of the scheme ... " 163 Then, that
person has acted unjustly to all those who might have in the future received benefits from that
system. 164 So a person who takes advantage of the system by accepting an organ but refusing to
donate upon their own death acts unjustly and unreasonably. Summarily, there is a certain point
to which self-preference in the furtherance of one's own well being is acceptable, but it must not
cause indifference toward other people's fulfillment of the basic values.
With respect to the morality of posthumous organ donation, conforming to this standard
of practical reasonableness seems to require that all people consent to gift their organs upon
death. Although some people express concern that they will not be treated as diligently if they
160
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agree to be an organ donor, these fears have been proven unwarranted. 165 Since at the time of
one's death, self-preservation and one's own physical well-being are no longer concerns, there is
nothing within the reasonable scope of self-preference that would support one's refusal to donate
organs. "[S]elfishness, cruelty, and the like, do not stand to something as self-evidently good as
the urge to self-preservation stands to the self-evident good of human life." 166 Any choice not to
donate organs at death based upon a feeling of selfishness, such as mere concern for one's
autonomy in making the decision, would not be reasonable. Hence, it appears that natural law
theory would permit even a system of routine recovery, without regard to consent, because every
person who is reasonable should decide that the basic values of life, friendship and practical
reasonableness demand this action. In fact, failing to donate one's organs would be directly
adverse to the basic value of human life, because it would deny others access to life saving
opportunity for no reason.
Subsequently, one must look to the consequences of one's actions and seek to "bring
about good in the world ... by actions that are efficient for their (reasonable) purposes." 167 It is
important to note that, according to Finnis, this is merely a factor in making the judgment of
whether an action is morally permitted, instead of the ultimate question as consequentialism
would provide. 168 Consequentialism or utilitarianism cannot properly address the basic values
because the assertion of the greatest net good and related concepts cannot be applied to the seven
goods, and could not unless humans all sought a single, dominant end. 169 That being established,
efficiency and consequences must be considered in the process of practical reasonableness.
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This sixth requirement in the evaluation goes directly to the heart of the issue presented
herein. In describing an example of what it means to satisfy this requirement, Finnis states the
following: "Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer basic human goods (such as
life) to merely instrumental goods (such as property)." From this statement it can be inferred
that natural law dictates that an individual place priority upon the value of human life over the
mere value of property rights that they may have in their organs. Many of the objections to any
type of presumed consent or routine recovery systems of organ donation place emphasis upon the
property rights of an individual, or their surviving kin, over the body of the decedent. These
arguments clearly fail under natural law because the inherent value in preserving human life is
superior to any concern of property rights. As has been explained, all seven goods are furthered
in some way by the posthumous gifting of organs. In fact, the only basic value that could
potentially be interfered with by the even the most extreme routine recovery system would be the
good of religion.
The issue of religious concerns with regard to organ donation warrants discussion here.
While not all spiritual beliefs can be accounted for herein, a study of several widely recognized
religious factions reveals that there are significant differences among treatment of cadaveric
organ donation. 170 The following religions have found that organ donation is acceptable, if not
encouraged under their faith. Generally, Christian religions support organ donation and consider
it a charitable act worthy of praise. 171 Hinduism does not require that the human body be intact,
and its mythology includes tales of the ""use of body parts to benefit others." 172 In fact, the
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World Council of Hindus has expressed its full support of organ donation. 173 Sikhism does not
stress any importance that bodies are intact at death, and in fact, remains in this faith are
cremated. 174

When polled, the Sikh community showed support for organ donation. 175

Buddhists find that the integrity of a cadaver is not of paramount importance at death. 176
However, the issue of brain death presents problems for Buddhists, and scholars have reached
varying conclusions. 177

Modem Taoist scholars also find that their faith supports organ

donation. 178
There are also religions which, while in some instances appear to prohibit organ
donation, seem to support it in at least limited circumstances. Judaism has rules prohibiting the
desecration of a dead body, the delaying of a burial and the receipt of benefit from a dead
body. 179 However, many Jewish scholars contend that the principle saving lives supersedes
those rules, and that most other rules of the religion can be ignored in the effort to save a life. 180
According to Islam, one must not violate a human body, whether alive or not. 181 Despite that
fact, Islamic scholars have issued religious rulings finding that the act of saving a life is such an
important one that organ donation is allowed by the religion because of the principle that
"necessity overrides prohibition." 182 However, many members of this faith remain hesitant to
donate, perhaps also because their beliefs require that burial occur within twenty-four hours of
death, and organ retrieval may interfere with this timeframe. 183 Jehovah's Witnesses, who had
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previously been completely opposed to organ donation, now allow each individual to make the
choice whether or not organs should be transplanted, with the caveat that no blood may be
removed. 184 Confucianism expresses the ideal that each person should die with a whole body
and finds that to remove organs from that body would be disrespectful to one's parents. 185 While
that belief is still widely held, some scholars contend that the good of sustaining others justifies
organ donation. 186
Lastly, there is only one religion that appears to steadfastly prohibit organ donation.
Members of the Shinto faith have strong feelings about cadavers and believe that any removal of
organs can have consequences for the soul of their lost loved one and the surviving kin! 87
Therefore, they wholeheartedly disapprove of organ donation. 188

Through the process of

practical reasonableness, religion must be taken into account but cannot be considered as more
important than the other six basic values combined. In the unlikely scenario that one's religion
forbids organ donation, that person must still make a reasonable choice taking all things into
account. Therefore, if one wishes to be reasonable, they cannot refuse donation on religious
grounds alone.
The seventh requirement of practical reasonableness is that there must be respect for
every basic value in every act. 189 This means that one must not act in a way that satisfies some
desire that is not a basic value and is adverse to any one of the those human goods.

190

However,

where one must choose among conflicting values, as is the circumstance with posthumous organ
donation, one may act contrary to a basic good indirectly, in order to promote that good or other
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basic goods.

191

Practical reasonableness necessitates that one must be ''creatively open to all the

basic goods and ... adjust his projects so as to minimize their damaging 'side effects' and to avoid
substantial and irreparable harms to persons." 192
In applying these standards to the issue presented here, it becomes evident that objections
made based upon religious grounds may defeat some of the above conclusions about what
natural law supports. Since, in some circumstances, a routine recovery system would damage
the basic value of religion, this course may only be taken if it promotes all of the goods in some
way. As is noted above, even the human good of religion is advanced by organ donation, as the
person whose life has been saved can go on to make that value a part of their life. Accordingly,
natural law theory would still support a routine recovery system. However, it is worth noting
that the proposed law does not cause damage to the value of religion because it allows for
exception from the presumed consent portion of the system on the grounds of religious or
cultural custom. Thus the seventh requirement is satisfied.
Next is the requirement of furthering the common good in one's communities. 193 Finnis
defines this common good as "a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to
attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s),
for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other .. .in a community." 194 In
this analysis, the community (United States) has a reasonable objective (improving organ
donation rates) which requires collaboration toward the common good. Justice requires that the
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good of an individual may not be regarded over the well-being of another, and that the common
good of the community must be advanced to promote human flourishing. 195
The common good sought here is to increase organ donation rates, thereby helping to
save lives that would be lost due to current shortages. None of the systems discussed herein
require the favoring of one individual's well-being over another because the donor would already
be deceased. Increasing donation rates would help to improve the overall quality of life for the
community because people would have better access to life saving transplants. As a result, fewer
people would be sick or dying unnecessarily. Therefore, the common good of the community is
best served by the option which would result in the availability of as many organs for
transplantation as possible.
The final requirement of practical reasonableness is that one follow his or her
conscience. 196 According to Finnis, this means that one must not take action which he or she
feels to be wrong. 197 While it is recognized that one's conscience may be misleading if one is
not guided by the basic values of human good, Finnis argues that if one does engage in the
process of practical reasonableness, his or her conscience will demand the same practical
result. 198 Since it is clear that the process of practical reasonableness results in a finding that the
method which creates a situation in which the most potential organs are available for transplant
is reasonable, a person who properly applies the process will find their conscience in line with
this result.
Based upon the above detailed process of practical reasonableness, it is evident that
reasonableness, by natural law standards, requires that all people agree to donate their organs at
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death. This is the ideal situation, but is one that is unfortunately very difficult to implement. It
appears that natural law would support most of the more extreme methods that would be less
acceptable to the general public. While natural law theorists might argue that the proposed
program does not do enough to increase organ donation rates, they would most likely agree that
any increase is better than none. Thus, Finnis would likely support the suggested program.
CONCLUSION

There must be a change to the current system in order to increase rates of organ donation
and save lives. There are many options available that would increase rates of cadaveric organ
donation, ranging from not requiring consent of any kind, to limiting the kind of consent that
matters. Although most moral theorists would agree with more radical theories that would result
in higher donation rates than the program suggested herein, the likelihood of the American
public accepting such radical changes is very low. In order to maximize donation rates within
the bounds of acceptability to the general public, the proposed legislation is the best available
alternative.

Use of the mandated choice system serves autonomy interests by requiring

individuals to make a choice as to whether they will donate their organs. In the event that they
refuse to make such a choice the default rule of presumed consent reflects the majority opinion
that most people would consent to organ donation upon death. This is fairest and most likely to
be approved plan of action. Therefore, because it is the most likely to have success and it is
supported on a moral basis, the system proposed herein should be pursued.

